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Calculating restaurant failure rates using longitudinal
census data
J. J. Healy a and Máírtín Mac Con Iomaire b
aDepartment of Tourism and Hospitality, Cork Institute of Technology, Cork, Ireland; bSchool of
Culinary Arts & Food Technology, Dublin Institute of Technology, Dublin, Ireland
ABSTRACT
Failure rates in the restaurant industry are popularly perceived
to be far higher than they actually are. This paper calculates
failure rates in the Irish Food and Drinks Sector (IFDS), for the
first time, using longitudinal census data from the Central
Statistics Office (CSO) in Ireland, which follows the European
statistical classification of economic activity (NACE). The results
are compared with previously published literature on restau-
rant failure rates in the United States of America. This study
also compares IFDS failure rates with other industry sectors in
Ireland (construction, manufacturing). Drawing on
Stinchcombe’s ’liability of newness’ theory, the informal falla-
cies theory ’Argumentum ad Populum’, and critical success
factors (CSFs) for restaurants theory, the paper explores restau-
rant failure rates both in Ireland and internationally. The
research finds that the average failure rates for the IFDS are
15% after one year; 37.62% after three years; and 53.06% after
five years in business, which, although marginally higher than
other industry sectors in Ireland, are considerably lower than
popularly perceived. Comparisons with previous studies in the
United States of America shows that Irish rates are significantly
lower, particularly in the first few years. The methodology can
be replicated to provide comparative studies between other
European countries using the NACE classifications. The results
may assist in ensuring that future policy decisions made by
governments, financial institutions and other restaurant/ hos-
pitality industry groups are more empirically based and better
informed.
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Introduction
This study seeks to clarify a number of apparent misconceptions concerning
restaurant failure rates, in the hope that prospective restaurateurs and entre-
preneurs may be more reliably informed about the risks involved. The study
calculates the failure rates of the Irish Food and Drinks Sector (IFDS), using
longitudinal census data from the Central Statistics Office (CSO) in Ireland,
which follows the European statistical classification of economic activity
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(NACE). It also compares IFDS failure rates with other industry sectors in
Ireland (construction, manufacturing). The results may help to ensure that
future policy decisions made by governments, financial institutions, and
other groups with an interest in the restaurant/hospitality business are
more empirically based.
It is over a quarter of a century since Muller and Woods (1991) published
preliminary research on the real failure rates of restaurants, which was influ-
enced by the earlier “organizational ecology” studies of Hannan and Freeman
(1977, 1984). They noted that “a common assumption in the restaurant industry
is that restaurants fail at an exceedingly high rate,” and highlighted the limited
nature of “statistical research to support this assumption” (Muller & Woods,
1991, p. 60). Despite more recent studies by other researchers on this phenom-
enon (see Table 1), including the seminal work of Parsa, Self, Njite, and King
(2005), the common perception of high failure rates (up to 90%) in the industry
persists (Keller, 2014). This chasm between academic and popular understand-
ing of failure rates may be explained by the numerous newspaper articles,
Table 1. Extant Literature on Restaurant Failure Rates
Researchers Year Title Methodology Data source Length
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television programs, blogs, and websites (Beever, 2016; Feloni, 2014; Keller,
2014; O’Dell, 2010) using data that are either “incomplete, anecdotal, or super-
ficial” (Camillo, Connolly, & Woo Gon, 2008, p. 366). It may also be influenced
by reality television programs that exaggerate the riskiness of the business overall
(Dalbor, Hua, & Andrew, 2014).
This poor perception of the restaurant industry is a major barrier for new
entrants who wish to secure financial support, or for existing restaurateurs
who wish to expand or grow their business, as the financial industry views
investment in restaurants as high risk. This paper would hope to create a
more favorable atmosphere among financial investors and government-
funded enterprise boards by demonstrating that the failure rate in the
restaurant sector is much lower than commonly perceived and that investing
in the sector is not significantly more risky than investing in other businesses
such as manufacturing or construction.
Most studies to date have highlighted the difficulty in obtaining accurate
data (business telephone directory listings, bankruptcy reports, health depart-
ment operating license permits) and how rates changed depending on what
criteria were chosen, for example, if change of ownership was registered as a
failure or not. Reliable statistics on small business failure are scarce and are
often produced or inferred from databases designed for other purposes. As a
result, and in the absence of any contrary evidence, dubious statistics sug-
gesting very high failure rates for small enterprises are frequently quoted and
have been allowed to form part of the folklore on this subject (Watson &
Everett, 1996, p. 45). Argumentum ad Populum (Latin—an argument to the
people) is the logical fallacy that if a lot of people believe something, it must
be true. This fallacy is not unique to small businesses or restaurants. In the
field of product innovation, Castellion and Markham (2013) discuss the
common assertion for new product failure rates of 80–90%, despite that
actual rate being around 40%.
The Irish Food and Drink Sector (IFDS) is one of the largest employers in
the State, a major contributor to the success of the Irish tourism industry,
and a valuable financial contributor to the Irish economy (Bord Bia, 2016).
The IFDS, like other sectors, can be a high-risk venture for inexperienced and
uninformed entrants. However, despite the perceived high failure rates for
the industry, a significant number of new businesses open every year. This
paper presents the first study using longitudinal census data of failure rates in
Ireland and proposes a model for similar comparative studies across Europe.
This study follows a three-step process. First, through analysis of longitudinal
data from the Central Statistics Office (CSO), it aims to discover original
failure rates for the IFDS over a one-, three-, and five-year period. Second,
these new figures for the IFDS will then be compared to international studies
on failure rates in this area. This comparison of the IFDS and international
restaurant failure rates was justified by using the restaurant classification
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method provided by Canziani, Almanza, Frash, McKeig, and Sullivan-Reid
(2016), which demonstrated that all of the businesses outlined in the NACE
descriptor (division 56) qualify to be identified as restaurants. Finally, the
IFDS figures will be comparatively analyzed with failure rates in other Irish
industries (construction and manufacturing).
Our findings should be of interest to researchers, financiers, advisors, and
policy makers. Perhaps more importantly, our findings should also ensure
that chefs, restaurateurs, or entrepreneurs who are contemplating opening a
new venture are not discouraged from doing so by a false belief that new
restaurant ventures are significantly less likely to succeed than other indus-
tries, such as construction or manufacturing. Our research may encourage
further comparative research within an Irish and European context using the
NACE classifications.
Importance of food and drink sector to the Irish economy
The IFDS was worth approximately €7.5 billion to the Irish economy in 2016
(Bord Bia, 2016). Fáilte Ireland (2014) indicated that tourists spend €2.5
billion on food and drink. In 2016, overseas visitor numbers grew by 25.9%
from the 2014 level (Fáilte Ireland, 2016). Bord Bia (2016) forecast that the
Irish foodservice market will have a compounded growth rate of 4.9%,
predicting a figure of €9.1 billion in sales for 2020. According to the CSO
(2014), 108,624 people were employed full-time in the food and drink sector.
The Tourism Review (Failte Ireland, 2014) report would suggest adding a
further 30,000 people employed on a part-time basis. Bord Bia (2016) provide
the breakdown of the Irish foodservice market, which comprises over 33,000
individual outlets, as follows:
● Limited Service 35%
● Pubs 18%
● Hotels 17%
● Full Service 12%
● Institutional 9%
● Café 5%
● Other Commercial 4%
The figures highlighted above demonstrate the importance of the sector to
the Irish economy and the need for factual data on the failure rates for
businesses in this sector.
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Conceptualizing the foodservice field
This section presents the conceptual and theoretical underpinning for
restaurant failure rates. Commencing with a brief overview of historical
and sociological literature globally, literature concerning restaurants in
Ireland is then discussed. The paper then focuses on existing international
literature on restaurant failure before addressing the critical success/failure
factors (CSFs). Examples of literature on failure rates from other industries
will be used to contextualize the phenomenon. Literature on restaurant
segmentation will also be discussed. The paper engages with a number of
theoretical discussions of factors that influence failure rates such as the
“liability of newness” theory (Stinchcombe, 1965; Yang & Aldrich, 2016);
the mythology of inflated failure rates or informal fallacies “Argumentum
ad Populum” (Castellion & Markham, 2013; Engel, 1982); and finally the
theories of critical success factors (CSFs) for restaurants (Camillo et al.,
2008; Parsa et al., 2005).
Academic interest in restaurants and the foodservice sector has grown
steadily in recent decades, starting with Mennell’s (1985) treatise on eating
and taste in England and France from the Middle Ages to the present using
Norbert Elias’ civilizing process theory, and Fine’s (1996) sociological study
of the culture of restaurant work. Scapp and Seitz (1998) explored the
relationship between eating and culture from a variety of perspectives,
including anthropology, sociology, philosophy, gender studies, race studies,
and architecture. Hospitality has been explored from a societal perspective
(Lashley, Lynch, & Morrison, 2007) and from its historical origins
(O’Gorman, 2010). A research focus on restaurants has been firmly estab-
lished as a valid academic pursuit.
Research on failure rates and CSFs for Irish restaurants is sparse and
embryonic (Bergin, 2002; Melia, 2010). Healy (2014) provides an intro-
ductory study of CSFs for Irish restaurants and profiles of two successful
restaurateurs. Allen and Mac Con Iomaire (2016, 2017) profiled head
chefs in Ireland (some of whom are Chef/proprietors) and identified
success factors for Irish head chefs. However, the seminal research on
restaurants in Ireland is the work of Mac Con Iomaire (2008, 2009, 2011,
2013, 2015), which is principally historic, ethnographic, and mostly
focused on haute cuisine restaurants. Information booklets produced
by county enterprise boards on setting up food businesses have stated
that the failure rate for food businesses is 30% in the first year (Kerry
County Enterprise Board, 2015). This would appear to be roughly based
on some of the previously cited international studies. However, they do
not reflect the real failure rate for Irish food and drink enterprises. This
paper is the first to provide empirical failure rates for the Irish Food and
Drink Sector.
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Various components of the European restaurant industry have received
specific attention. In Sweden, Gustafsson, Öström, Johansson, and
Mossberg (2006) developed a holistic Five Aspects Meal Model: a tool
for developing meal services in restaurants focusing on the room, the
meeting, the product, the management control system, and finally, the
atmosphere. Mamalis (2009) studied critical success factors for the fast
food industry in Greece; Gehrels (2013) researched success factors for
small upper-segment culinary restaurant owners in the Netherlands, while
Balazs (2002) explored the phenomenon of entrepreneurial three-
Michelin-starred chefs in France. There remains, however, a dearth of
research on restaurant failure rates in Europe.
A number of interesting studies on restaurants and foodservice have
emerged from America in recent years, including research on gender in the
kitchen (Harris & Giuffre, 2015), the changing historical role and acceptance
of the ethnic restaurateur (Ray, 2016), and the practice of tipping (Estreicher
& Nash, 2016). Leschziner (2015) focuses on creativity in elite restaurants but
provides a comprehensive theoretical underpinning to the study of restau-
rants (organizational analysis, theory of action, theory of practice), particu-
larly the notion of the culinary field, built on the cultural production theory
of Bourdieu (1996) and the gastronomic field theory developed by Ferguson
(1998, 2006).
The majority of the research in restaurant failure rates has been carried
out in the United States. However, Hannan and Freeman (1977, p. 959)
noted their frustration with the lack of empirical longitudinal studies on
organizations and also highlighted that “census data are presented in a
manner that renders the calculation of failure rates impossible.” They
further highlighted awareness that the failure rate of small businesses
was high, quoting an annual failure rate estimate of upwards of 8% for
small firms in the United States, partly explained by the “liability of
newness” theory (Stinchcombe, 1965). New firms are believed to have
high closure rates and these closures are believed to be failures, but
Headd’s (2003) research using two U.S. Census Bureau data sources
illustrated that these assumptions may not be justified. Closure does not
necessarily mean failure, as will be outlined later in this paper. Muller and
Woods (1991, p. 65) proposed that other researchers, whether educators
or operators, should carry out similar research in their own local markets
to increase our overall understanding of real restaurant failure rates. Parsa
et al. (2005) presented a model for future research suggesting that internal
factors affected restaurant failures more than external factors, noting
however that both internal and external factors apply. Everett and
Watson (1998) found that external economic factors were associated
with 30–50% of small business failures.
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Restaurant failure rates
Internationally, the principal academic studies in the field of restaurant
failure have been conducted in the United States of America. Existing
literature includes Muller and Woods (1991), English, Josiam, Upchurch,
and Willems (1996), Parsa et al. (2005), Camillo et al. (2008), Parsa, Self,
Sydnor-Busso, and Yoon (2011), Parsa, van der Rest, Smith, Parsa, and
Bujisic (2015), and Self, Jones, and Botieff (2015). These studies have gener-
ated accurate percentages for success and failure in the restaurant industry in
Georgia, Colorado, Texas, Ohio, and California (see Table 1). The research of
Mandabach, Siddiqui, Blanch, and VanLeeuwen (2011) focused on Southern
New Mexico has been omitted from Table 1, as its findings mirror those of
Camillo et al. (2008).
Research by Luo and Stark (2014) that used 20 years of Bureau of Labor
statistics, while interesting, is not directly relevant to this study as they
concentrated on determining a failure rate for independent full service
restaurants only. They found that the median lifespan of restaurants is
about 4.5 years, slightly longer than that of other service businesses
(4.25 years), although when measuring restaurant start-ups with 5 or fewer
employees, the median lifespan is 3.75 years, slightly shorter than that of
other service businesses of the same start-up size (4.0 years). As their
research target is a subset of our research cohort, it cannot be considered
for direct comparison. Equally, the literature on failure rates of franchises
versus conventional small businesses is outside the scope of this paper
(Stanworth, Purdy, Price, & Zafiris, 1998). Mamalis (2009) identifies “adap-
tion to locality,” “place to be,” and “sales incentive programs” as recent
additions to the CSF family, but as his study focuses solely on the fast food
industry, it could not be directly compared to this study. Muller and Woods
(1994) research on restaurant segmentation has been recently updated by
Canziani et al. (2016), and DiPietro (2017) highlights the gap in the literature
for a more detailed breakdown of a wider range of restaurant segments when
discussing failure rates and creating research projects.
When Muller and Woods (1991) conducted their 10-year study of restau-
rant failure, they used telephone directory listings and data from agencies
that track bankruptcies to populate their data tables. A similar approach was
taken by English et al. (1996) where they utilized listings in the Yellow Pages.
Parsa et al. (2005) conducted their three-year project using data collected
from the Columbus Health Department in Ohio. They found this to be a
more accurate way to track restaurant failure.
Not only must every restaurateur renew the health permit annually, but any
change in the restaurant’s legal ownership requires a new permit. The health
department ascribes to each restaurant location a specific identification number.
This ID is a permanent number that does not change with a change in ownership.
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Similarly, each restaurant owner has a specific identification number. A compar-
ison of the ownership and location ID numbers reveals any change in restaurant
ownership. (Parsa et al., 2005, p. 309)
Muller and Woods (1991) found a failure rate of 27% in the first year, less than
50% by end of year three and 60% by end of year five. They also stated that the
failure rate after 10 years was less than 70%. In their study, English et al. (1996)
found an average first-year failure rate of 26%, 40% in year three, and 60% in
year five. Parsa et al. (2005) reported the rate of failure to be 26.16% in year one
and 59.74% in year three; however, owing to their study covering the period
1996–1999, they did not record a five-year figure for failure (Figure 1).
Much of the early research data concerning failure rates for the restaurant
industry focused on financial performance and considered bankruptcy reports
only (Gu, 2002; Kwansa & Cho, 1995; Urdang, 1992). Parsa et al. (2005, p. 304)
noted that “most bankruptcy studies are limited in their scope, however,
because many restaurant closures result from change-of-ownership actions,
rather than bankruptcies.” Stokes and Blackburn (2002) note a tendency to
associate business “closure” with business “failure,” confusing owners that
close a business with “unsuccessful” entrepreneurs. This confusion is true of
many small businesses. Their findings provide support for the concept of the
serial entrepreneur. Everett and Watson (1998, p. 371) highlight “that a
strengthening economy may provide the trigger for an increase in voluntary
business exits as individual proprietors seek to maximize the returns available
to them on both their financial and human capital.” Headd (2003, p. 51) using
two U.S. Census Bureau data sources noted:
The significant proportion of businesses that closed while successful calls into
question the use of ‘business closure’ as a meaningful measure of business out-




















Year 1 Year 3 Year 5
Comparison of Cumulative Average from 4 Studies
Muller and Woods 1991 English et al 1996 Parsa et al 2005 Current Study 2017
Figure 1. Comparison of cumulative average from four studies.
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closed a business without excess debt, sold a viable business, or retired from the
work force.
Mac Con Iomaire (2009, 2013) found that historically, many Irish restaurants
closed owing to various factors such as (1) owner’s ill-health, (2) lack of interest
from family members to inherit the business, (3) lease/rental increases or
termination by landlord, (4) suburbanization or the change of traffic flow/lack
of parking. Camillo et al. (2008) highlight that weather, disease, storms, or
economic downturns can also lead to restaurant failures. They conclude that
bankruptcy-only studies tend to show lower failure rates than studies which
incorporate broader definitions of failure (Camillo et al., 2008).
Critical success factors: an overview
Researchers have identified success and failure factors from analyses of in-
depth interviews with restaurateurs who experienced both sides of the busi-
ness (Table 2). According to Parsa et al. (2005), there are 12 elements of
success, ranging in importance from “distinctive concept” as the most
important, to “location choice” as the least. Other successful elements listed
were as follows:
● Long-term planning;
● Ability to adapt technology;
● On-going training for staff;
● Effective and regular communication with staff;
Table 2. List of Failure and Success Factors
Common success factors Common failure factors
● Concept
● Clear vision, act do not react, stay focused/Clear vision
and mission, amend strategies as situation changes
● Balance between family and work life/be willing to
make substantial time commitment to restaurant and
family
● Follow industry and technology trends/Adapt desirable
technologies especially for record keeping and track-
ing customers
● Competent management/Educate managers through
continuing education
● Poor concept/Poor choice of location/
Owner’s ego
● Wrong pricing strategy/Negative consumer
perception
● No investment for employee training/
Disrespect of staff members
● Lack of documented strategy/
Underestimating the competition
● Poor management/Lack of business experi-
ence/frequent changes in management
● Frequent critical incidents/Non-controllable,
external factors,
● Lack of start-up capital or operational capital/
No management flexibility or innovation
● Entrepreneurial incompetence/Imbalance
between family and work life
● Excessive cost-cutting/Ignoring technology/
Destructive emotions
Source: Adapted fromParsa et al. (2005); Camillo et al. (2008)
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● Maintaining clear vision, mission and strategy;
● Dividing time between business and family;
● Consistent management with a degree of flexibility;
● Poor financial management;
● Poor food quality controls;
● Quality of service;
● Finally, ill-defined concept.
Camillo et al. (2008) found that in order to succeed, operators needed to
develop the following areas: (1) strategic vision, (2) business acumen, (3)
competitive drive, and (4) effectively managing both front-of-house and
back-of-house operations. Camillo et al. (2008, p. 378) also listed emotional
factors as important success elements of a restaurateur’s skills. They divided
these into two categories:
● Creative—Curiosity, Love, Fondness, Confidence, Ego, Success
● Destructive—Worrying, Restlessness, Depression, Desperation, Lack of
Values, Failure
Allen and Mac Con Iomaire (2016) found that personality factors also
influenced the career of chefs, noting that conscientiousness, extraversion,
positivity, independence, and confidence are traits that aid career success,
while neuroticism and openness are barriers. American restaurateur Danny
Meyer is adamant that this attention to emotional hospitality quality in his
staff is one of the key factors that made him successful (Meyer, 2008). His
“Virtuous Cycle of Enlightened Hospitality” philosophy underpins the suc-





● Investors (Meyer, 2008, p. 237).
The emotional element surfaces when he speaks about the attributes he seeks
when hiring staff, what he calls the “51 percenters” (2008, p. 243). Meyer
looks for 49% technical ability and excellence and for 51% emotional hospi-
tality. They must have five core skills as part of their emotional hospitality:
● Optimistic warmth—genuine, kind, thoughtful
● Intelligence—curiosity to learn for the sake of learning
● Work ethic—to do something as well as it can be done
● Empathy—how you care for others, how your actions make others feel
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● Self-awareness and Integrity—what makes you tick, inclination to be
accountable for doing the right thing with honesty and superb
judgment.
Table 2, adapted from the work of Parsa et al. (2005) and Camillo et al.
(2008), summarizes the common factors within the literature for both success
and failure in the restaurant industry.
Methodology
The principal design employed in this paper was a retrospective longitudinal
study of census data over a seven-year period (2008–2014). This method was
supported by an analysis of influential literature in this area as can be seen in
Table 1. The longitudinal data were obtained from the Central Statistics
Office (CSO) in Cork, Ireland, based on a query submitted in January
2016. Upon contacting the CSO by email, an explanation of the Parsa et al.
(2005) study was provided along with the following questions:
● How far back do your computerized records go?
● How are food businesses classified?
● How many food businesses were operating annually?
● Can they be separated by county/province/region/division/urban/rural?
● Can you identify how many new businesses open each year?
● Can you track these new operators year by year?
● When a business terminates, is there a reason recorded for this?
From this began a dialogue that ended with a table of verifiable data on
enterprise births and survival numbers for businesses in the Irish Food and
Drink Sector (IFDS), for a five-year period (see Table 3).
Table 3. Food and Beverage Service Activities
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Enterprise births in reference year
(Number)
1044 989 1037 1105 1082 1014 1063
Enterprise births surviving one year to reference year
(Number)
.. 884 811 879 963 934 863
Enterprise births surviving two years to reference year
(Number)
.. .. 762 709 776 842 819
Enterprise births surviving three years to reference year
(Number)
.. .. .. 691 645 700 743
Enterprise births surviving four years to reference year
(Number)
.. .. .. .. 632 598 634
Enterprise births surviving five years to reference year
(Number)
.. .. .. .. .. 590 554
Source: Central Statistics Office (2016)
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According to the CSO and Eurostat parameters, the IFDS participants
have been compiled from the NACE descriptors. NACE stems from the
French “nomenclature statistique des activités économiques dans la
Communauté Européenne,” and is the European statistical classification of
economic activities (Central Statistics Office, 2007; Eurostat, 2016). The
current version was established in December 2006 by Regulation (EC) No.
1893/2006. Sector I covers Accommodation and Food Service Activities,
which is further subdivided into divisions. Division 56 covers any food or
beverage service activities providing complete meals or drinks fit for immedi-
ate consumption, whether served in restaurants (full service, self-service, fast
food), cafés, coffee shops, delicatessen, food trucks, mobile fast food, public
houses, food stalls, or event or outdoor caterers (Central Statistics Office,
2016b). The data collated from the CSO statistics has been taken from the
following divisions:
• 5610—Restaurants and Mobile food service activities
• 5621—Event catering activities
• 5629—Other food service activities
• 5630—Beverage serving activities
Table 1 shows that one of the preferred methods used in the majority of
studies was longitudinal data analysis, combined in some cases with in-depth
interviews (Camillo et al., 2008; Parsa et al., 2005). The data collected for this
current study from the CSO, similar to that of Parsa et al. (2005, p. 309), has
a system of “fail-safe,” in that each new food or drink enterprise in the State
is provided with a unique number from the Revenue Department that is born
and dies with that business. Even if the business was to change ownership
and keep its original name, it would still receive a new revenue number and
be classed as a new business. This has been highlighted as a potential
limitation of the study. Any economic activity through revenue channels
classifies the enterprise as living. If there is no economic activity for two
years, the business is classed as deceased.
Limitations of study
This research was unable to access individual data for each of the divisions/
segments in the IFDS. Although the international studies looked at restaurants
of all sizes and classifications and this study is examining the IFDS, the classi-
fication system devised by Canziani et al. (2016) qualifies all the establishments
in division 56 as restaurants. The restaurants involved in the studies in the
United States sold food and drink, and covered a broad spectrum of classifica-
tion from ethnic, quick service, self-service, take-out to fine dining. They also
covered independents, chains, and franchisees.
Similar to the methodology used by Parsa et al. (2005), the data for this
study are collected using unique revenue numbers, which are issued when a
JOURNAL OF CULINARY SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY 361
business begins life. However, if the business is sold, even if the new owner
continues to run the business as before and the same name is kept, a new
unique revenue number is issued and it appears in the data as a new business.
For example, the researchers interviewed one participant who was the third
owner of a business that had been trading successfully with the same name
over the door for 17 years, yet it would still have been recorded as three new
businesses. Therefore, under this data set, it would register as a failure when
in reality the business was still trading successfully just under new ownership.
This would suggest that the real failure rate might be even lower than is
currently calculated. Owing to data protection considerations, the CSO only
releases data for tracking companies for a period of 5 years from birth.
Findings and discussion
The figures represented in Table 3 stem from data supplied by the CSO. The
average number of new enterprises opening during the 2008–2014 period is
1,047.71. This means that every week, approximately 20 new IFDS companies
opened. The dip in premises opening in 2009 could probably be attributed to
the recession and the impact of the austerity measures that were implemen-
ted by the government in 2008, but which only had knock-on effects from
2009 (O’Farrell, 2013). Similarly, the upsurge in new businesses in the years
2010, 2011, and 2012 could reflect that purchase prices and rental rates
dropped dramatically during this period of the recession, thereby making it
more attractive to entrepreneurs to activate new start-ups. People who had
lost jobs in other industries may have used the unforeseen opportunity to
move into the hospitality industry, thereby utilizing their redundancy
packages to fund their new enterprises.
The failure rates were calculated by subtracting the births surviving from
the previous year. Hence, if the failure rate needed to be calculated for
companies that opened in 2008 (1044), this was done by subtracting the
number of births surviving year one in the 2009 column (884), which would
give a figure of 160. Therefore, of the 1044 businesses that opened in 2008,
160 were closed the following year. This represents a percentage failure rate
of 15.33% in year one. To calculate year two failure for businesses opened in
2008, subtract births surviving two years (762) from the previous year figure
(884), which means 122 companies closed in year two. This represents a
13.80% failure rate in that year. These calculations have been made for all the
years and can be seen in Table 4, which shows at a glance the failure and
survival rate for all new food and drink enterprises up to year five of their
existence. It can be seen that the year one failure rate (15%) is significantly
lower than what is quoted in recent publications (80%–60%–30%). It can also
be seen that, as the years pass, the failure rate diminishes. On examining
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these figures, it is apparent that the IFDS failure rate is much better than
popularly perceived—Argumentum ad Populum.
This decline in the failure rate year-on-year should be cause for optimism for
potential start-ups and investors in the sector. The data also correspond with the
international literature (Luo & Stark, 2014; Parsa et al., 2005) that found a
dramatic decline in failure rates after year five. It ties in with Stinchcombe’s
(1965) “liability of newness” theory where new organizations face a constellation
of problems associated with their newly founded status, which renders them
particularly prone to failure. Similarly, Allen and Mac Con Iomaire (2016, p.
122) found that satisfaction among head chefs in their jobs rose dramatically
after year five and did not begin to fall until after the twentieth year. A factor in
any new business or new position is learning the new role. A new firm must
invest time, either explicitly or implicitly, in educating its new employees to
execute their responsibilities. Table 4 shows the cumulative average of yearly
failure rates. These are compared to the international literature in Figure 1 that
clearly show a dramatic difference in year one, less difference in year three, and
only a marginal difference in year five.
Comparing IFDS with other sectors in Ireland
From a similar CSO databank, we were able to extract failure rates for two
other types of business sectors (manufacturing, construction), covering the
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Figure 2. Comparison of failure rates with other enterprises. Source: Central Statistics Office 2016
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description of each of these sectors is available on the CSO website (Central
Statistics Office, 2016a, 2016c). The comparison shows that the food and
drink sector compares favorably with the other sectors. In year one, con-
struction failure rate is higher than food and drink; manufacturing having
about a 2.5% lower failure rate. In year three and year five, food and drink
rates surpass construction by about 5% and are about 10% worse than
manufacturing. This 5% and 10% difference, however, is still not as large a
gap as popularly perceived by the public, media, and financial institutions. In
addition, according to Parsa et al. (2005), restaurant failure does not have as
large an impact financially on local communities as failure in other indus-
tries. Luo and Stark (2014) noted that the median lifespan for restaurant
start-ups was slightly higher than that of other service businesses.
Real failure rates
It is important to note that the title of this paper “Calculating Restaurant Failure
Rates using Longitudinal Census Data” differs from Muller and Woods’ (1991)
paper “The Real Failure Rate of Restaurants.” This paper, having reviewed the
international literature on small business failure (Everett & Watson, 1998;
Headd, 2003; Stokes & Blackburn, 2002; Watson & Everett, 1996; Yang &
Aldrich, 2016) and particularly restaurant failure rates (see Table 1), is clearly
aware of how failure rates can vastly differ depending on what criteria are being
applied (bankruptcy only, discontinuation of ownership, closure to prevent
further losses, failure to “make a go of it,” or discontinuance of business). If
the “real” failure rate for restaurants was calculated based on businesses that
closed down owing to lack of financial viability (Gu, 2002), the rate would be far
lower than current figures indicate, even those calculated using census data.
Everett and Watson (1998) highlighted that failure rates were positively asso-
ciated with interest rates and the rate of unemployment, but also, somewhat
unexpectedly, failure rates were found to be positively associated with lagging
employment rates and with current and lagging retail sales. Headd (2003, p. 51)
warned of the danger of confusing those who have executed a “planned exit
strategy, closed a business without excess debt, sold a viable business, or retired
from the work force” with failure; or of the “use of ‘business closure’ as a
meaningful measure of business outcome.” This is clearly an area that requires
further research and clarification.
Conclusions
This study set out to clarify a number of apparent misconceptions concern-
ing restaurant failure rates in the hope that prospective restaurateurs and
entrepreneurs may be more reliably informed about the risks involved. The
common fallacy Argumentum ad Populum explains the persistent myth that
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as many as 9 out of 10 restaurants fail in their first year (Keller, 2014; Lou &
Stark, 2014). Castellion and Markham (2013) highlight the role that both
academics and industry bodies need to play in debunking these myths and
counteracting them with accurate data in both the academic and popular
press.
A number of objectives were identified at the outset of this paper: the first was
to create original failure rates for the IFDS over a one-, three-, and five-year
period using longitudinal census data. The second objective was to compare
these Irish findings to international studies on failure rates in this area. The final
objective was to compare IFDS failure rates with other Irish industries (manu-
facturing, construction).
This study adds to the international literature on restaurant failure rates.
The paper concludes that the use of longitudinal census data can illuminate
the failure rates of businesses, but identifies the difficulty of the term “real”
failure rates, as these can differ depending on which criteria is applied.
Hannan and Freeman (1977) lamented the manner in which census data
were initially made available for research purposes. From 2008, data that
enable the calculation of failure rates became available within the NACE
protocol. The results for failure rates in the IFDS sector (Table 4) compare
favorably with international studies (Figure 1), particularly in years one and
three. When the IFDS failure rates were compared with other Irish industries
(construction, manufacturing), they were higher but not dramatically so
(Figure 2). The data in this study identify the real failure rate for the IFDS:
● 15% after one year in business
● 37.62% after three years in business
● 53.06% after five years in business
It must be stated that these five-year figures were calculated from businesses
that started in 2008 and 2009, which was at the peak of the recession, and
were still trading in their infancy during the recession. Both Fitzgerald (2014)
and Whelan (2013) identified 2012 as the year in which the country began to
emerge slowly from recession; nevertheless, these difficulties were also in situ
for all other businesses (construction, manufacturing) during this period.
Comparison with American studies found dramatic differences in failure
rates in year one and year three, but less dramatic ones, although still better
(7%), in year five. Stinchcombe (1965) argued that all new organizations suffer
a “liability of newness,” a greater risk of failure than older organizations,
because they depend on the cooperation of strangers, have low levels of
legitimacy, and are unable to compete effectively against established organiza-
tions. Yang & Aldrich (2016) results not only confirm the “liability of newness”
hypothesis, but also reveal a much higher risk of failure in organizations’ early
lifetime than rates found in previous research. Moreover, they highlighted the
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importance of entrepreneurs’ continuing effort after their initial organizing
attempts, and indicated that entrepreneurs contribute to the survival of a
venture through raising more resources, enacting routines, and gaining
increased public recognition of organizational boundaries. To counteract the
“liability of newness phenomenon, Muller and Woods (1991, p. 64) suggested
purchasing restaurants that were three years old. Within an Irish context, such
an action, although potentially successful, would register on the data as a
failure, which is one of the weaknesses of the CSO methodology that we
have highlighted as a limitation of this research.
This paper’s findings should allow first-time and existing Irish restaurateurs
and entrepreneurs to approach financial institutions with more confidence of
achieving access to funding for their enterprises when accompanied with an
appropriate business plan. It should also allow financiers and investors to have
a more open and objective perspective of the IFDS. It will allow them to
recognize that this sector is not significantly more risky than investing in
construction or manufacturing. The results may also help to ensure that future
policy decisions made by governments, financial institutions, and other groups
with an interest in the restaurant/hospitality business are more soundly based.
Further research
In the limitations of this paper we noted our inability to source segmented
breakdown from the CSO. In time it may be possible to receive data from the
CSO on the different divisions in the food and drink sector, thereby calculat-
ing failure rates for each division/segment and comparing results to interna-
tional research such as Luo and Stark (2014) or Mamalis (2009). Muller and
Woods (1994) were early researchers to highlight the importance of restau-
rant segmentation. Their work has been updated by Canziani et al. (2016),
and DiPietro (2017) suggests that scholars developing future projects look at
a wider range of restaurant segments. European segment types such as café,
pub, bistro, brasserie, and pizzeria need to be adequately matched with the
American quick-serve, casual dining, and family dining segmentation, so that
research on both sides of the Atlantic can be equally compared. Due to data
protection issues, companies are only tracked for 5 years from birth. It would
provide more accurate and interesting data if this period of tracking were
extended to 10 years. This would also allow research into the area of restau-
rant longevity. We recommend such research to be conducted as soon as
segmentation data become available, and urge the CSO and their European
counterparts to assist in providing such data.
Following this paper’s findings about failure rates in Ireland, we recom-
mend future research drawing on qualitative interviews with both successful
restaurateurs and those who have experienced restaurant failure to examine
further what factors affect failure of businesses in the IFDS. These findings
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could be compared with similar studies in other countries to see if any factors
are universal, and which are culturally specific.
The data for most of this study are for the years when the Irish economy
was in recession (2008–2012). It would be interesting to examine similar data
from non-recession years (2014–2019) when they become available to
develop a comparative analysis. Through the use of the NACE descriptors
code, this study could be used as a template to investigate and compare
failure rates in all the member states of the European Union. It is unclear
whether the UK authorities will continue to collect data using the NACE
descriptors following Brexit.
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